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 1. Introduction 
  There are three reasons why Ronald Findlay and I decided to call our 2007 
history of international trade "Power and Plenty". The first and most important is that 
Peter Dougherty and Richard Baggaley at Princeton University Press thought that it 
would be a good idea, but there were two important intellectual reasons as well. More 
narrowly, "Power and Plenty" refers to the mercantilist belief that plenty was 
necessary for states because it provided them with the sinews of power; and 
conversely, that power was necessary in order for states to be able to secure plenty. 
The first of these two assumptions seems uncontroversial even today, since potential 
military power stems ultimately from countries' productive capacity per person, and 
their populations. The second assumption is much more controversial, even though it 
remained widespread into the 20th century. An "optical illusion" is what Norman 
Angell called it in his famous book written shortly before the outbreak of World War 
I, and shattering the illusion was the primary purpose of that book (Angell 1909). 
  More broadly, "Power and Plenty" refers to our belief, supported by 1000 
years of evidence, that globalization is as much a political, and a geopolitical, 
phenomenon as it is a technological one. One immediate implication is that predicting 
the future of globalization is a foolhardy exercise, especially for economists, since it 
necessarily involves making implicit or explicit judgements about the future of the 
international political system, judgements which we are ill-equipped to make. Another 
implication is that globalization is potentially reversible: while technologies are 
typically not forgotten, political choices have led to the world becoming less 
integrated in the past, and might well do so again in the future. 
  I am therefore going to do two things in this paper. First, I will speculate about 
the geopolitical environment within which the future of globalization will be 
  1determined. Second, in so doing I will keep an eye on how trends in plenty will 
influence power in the 21
st century, and will speculate about ways in which power 
may have feedback effects upon plenty, if we are not careful. Above all, however, I 
will be stressing how unknowable the future of globalization is, and how it will 
depend upon the choices which politicians make, for better or for worse, over the 
coming years. Indeed, the choices which they make in the next two or three years 
could be more important for the rest of the century than one might wish. 
  I will begin by making some comments about the role which unpredictable 
shocks and path dependence, on the one hand, and long trends on the other, may play 
in determining future geopolitical trends, and the course of globalization. About 
unpredictable shocks we can say relatively little, but I will say more about some of the 
long run trends which one can safely predict will be important over the next few 
decades. Key areas of uncertainty will also be flagged. I will next discuss ways in 
which power may come to be seen as important in ensuring plenty, if faith in the 
multilateral trading system starts to wane; talk about some of the domestic political 
pressures to which governments will be subjected in the future and which will also be 
important in determining the future course of the international economy; and 
emphasise how important the current crisis may be in determining the future of 
globalization over coming decades.  
 
2. Trends and shocks 
  It is instructive to speculate about what an observer in 1945 or 1950 (and there 
is a big difference even between these two years, separated by just half a decade!) 
might have been reasonably able to predict regarding the shape of the global political 
and economic system in 1975. World War II had clearly produced two main victors, 
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the geopolitical system in 1973 dominated by the two superpowers. Nor, perhaps, 
would the Cold War have been so surprising, even from the perspective of 1945, 
although one has to wonder how many observers in May 1945 foresaw the extent to 
which Eurasia would have become communist – and hence ruled by governments 
hostile to international trade – just five years later. Another major shift in the 
international balance of power – and a force for deglobalization during much of the 
late 20
th century – was decolonization. In retrospect, the decline of European 
colonialism seems an inevitable consequence of Europe’s loss of relative plenty and 
military power, but one wonders how many Europeans saw it coming in 1945 or even 
1950, by which time the Dutch had already been evicted from Indonesia, and the 
French were facing stiff military opposition in Indochina.  
The Yom Kippur war of 1973 which triggered the first oil shock, thus bringing 
Europe’s Golden Age of economic growth to a shuddering halt, might not have come 
as an enormous surprise to an observer in 1950: the seeds of the Middle Eastern 
conflict which has poisoned international relations for decades had already been 
planted. On a more positive note, Marshall Aid and the formation of the OEEC were 
both foretastes of the European integration to come, and which was bolstered in 1973 
by the first enlargement of the EEC. 
By 1950, then, a lot of the major themes underlying international relations in 
1973 were predictable at some very general level. However, just five years earlier, in 
1945, everything was still to play for, or at least it must have seemed that way: the 
future of Europe, the future of China, the future of the Middle East all hung in the 
balance in 1945, or so one might reasonably have thought at the time. 
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would surely be far more disoriented than their colleague of the late 1940s, although 
oil and the Arab-Israeli conflict continue to play a malign role in international 
relations. By 1973 Nixon had visited China, but Mao’s death, and a lot of political 
manoeuvring, would be required before Deng Xiaoping could take over as Chinese 
leader and open its economy to the outside world. Was it really predictable that the 
Soviet Union would so utterly collapse under the weight of its own internal 
contradictions? Ça se discute. And even if one makes that case, the Chinese example 
suggests that there was nothing inevitable about the break-up of the Soviet empire, 
and the eastward enlargement of the European Union – just as the future of countries 
such as Georgia and the Ukraine seem up for grabs today. The world would be a very 
different place in 2009, were it not for Mikhail Gorbachev. 
Sometimes history runs along railway tracks in ways that allow one to clearly 
identify underlying trends, at least ex post. Sometimes it jumps the tracks, in entirely 
unpredictable ways. So the shape of the world in 2030 is, in all honesty, entirely 
unknowable, and this is an important lesson of history. As the experience of the past 
decade or two shows, there is nothing more dangerous for the economy than when 
market participants allow themselves to believe that there is no such thing as 
Knightian uncertainty. 
As economic historians, we are trained to take path dependence seriously – the 
decisions that people take can really matter. Very big shocks to the system – such as 
the First World War, or the Great Depression – have had long run effects on the world 
economy that would have been quite unpredictable at the time. This is why the last 
three chapters of Power and Plenty, dealing with the 19
th century, the interwar period, 
and the late 20
th century, in each case start with an examination of the world military 
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we are all familiar. This is also why the ways in which today’s politicians respond to 
today’s world economic crisis matter so much, not just for the economic outlook over 
the next few years, but potentially for the shape of the world economy in decades to 
come. 
 
3. Long run trends 
  Some long run trends seem fairly predictable, and there is therefore 
widespread discussion of them today. Most predictable of all is the continued 
convergence of much of the developing world, notably in Asia, on the core economies 
of Europe and North America. Of course, not even this outcome, which seems a 
racing certainty, can be entirely taken for granted. As Figure 1 shows, the late 20
th 
century saw both convergence and divergence of various regions of the world vis à vis 
the United States, which can reasonably be taken to have represented the world 
technological frontier at the time. The figure plots regional GDP per capita as a 
percentage of the US level, and shows clearly the convergence experienced by 
Western Europe, Japan, and the Tiger economies of East Asia. The figure shows that 
China joined the convergence club in the late 1970s, as did India in the 1980s and 
(especially) the 1990s, after initially diverging for three decades.  
 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
  The figure also makes it clear that there were disappointments as well as 
successes: the failure of India and China to converge before they opened themselves 
up to world markets; the relative collapse of the USSR, Eastern Europe and the 
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Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa. The timing of the Indian and Chinese growth 
spurts shows clearly the importance of policy in bringing about convergence, and 
suggests the possibility that policy might in the future again block it: in particular, if 
either of these countries were to turn inwards again, or find themselves barred from 
world markets, their potential growth rates would presumably fall substantially. In the 
Chinese case, there is the additional uncertainty created by that country’s increasingly 
anomalous political system, as well the risk of conflict with Taiwan or elsewhere. 
  Continued convergence is therefore not certain, but let us assume that the next 
century is indeed characterised above all else by the continued unravelling of the 
enormous asymmetries created by the Industrial Revolution two centuries ago, and 
that Asia will regain its rightful economic and political stature on the world stage. 
There are a number of consequences which would seem to flow from such a scenario, 
and which have been widely discussed in recent times. The first is that the balance of 
political and military power will shift eastward, and that both India and China will 
become more assertive in pushing their own interests internationally, including by 
military means if necessary. The second is that Sino-Indian relations will come to be 
increasingly important for the world as a whole: Robert Kaplan (2009) sees Sino-
Indian rivalry in the Indian Ocean as a defining feature of 21
st century geopolitics. 
The third is that the world’s international economic institutions will no longer 
predominantly reflect European and American interests: they will either be 
representative of the world as a whole, or they will cease to be relevant. As the 
experience in the recent Doha round of trade talks, and the G-20 summits, shows, this 
is something which is already happening. 
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existing supplies of oil and other raw materials, driving up prices. It would be more 
than unfortunate if today’s leaders took the slump in oil prices created by the 
depression as a signal that last year’s fears about dwindling oil supplies are no longer 
relevant: fuel scarcity will be a key trend during the century ahead. A fifth, related 
consequence is that there will be increasing international tension regarding carbon 
emissions and climate change, since India and China cannot be allowed to absent 
themselves from the international effort to avert a catastrophe, but have every right to 
accuse the West of hypocrisy on the issue. A sixth consequence is that a growing 
number of countries, including China, will become increasingly dependent on 
international markets for supplies of food and raw materials. Readers can probably 
think of other consequences for themselves. 
  Related to the rise of various third world giants will of course be the relative 
decline of the United States and its allies. American relative decline seems to be 
already well underway, after the brief hubris of its unipolar moment. The limits of 
American military power can be seen in Iraq and Afghanistant, and were brutally 
underscored by Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia. Indeed, the latter conflict also 
highlighted the decline in American soft power after two terms of George Bush, since 
the Americans were not even able to condemn Russian behaviour in a particularly 
convincing manner. The United States will remain the world’s leading economy for 
some time to come, especially if the definition of ‘leading’ encompasses technological 
progressiveness rather than mere scale. And yet, American dependence on foreign oil 
and foreign capital implies that in the economic and political domains, it has to take 
account of the interests of capital- and oil-exporting countries, interests which do not 
necessarily coincide with its own. One key question mark hanging over the next few 
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regards capital, the Federal government will clearly be borrowing a lot of money, and 
so private savings rates will have to considerably increase if the country is not to 
become an even bigger net borrower. As regards oil, the current crisis ought in 
principle be an opportunity to invest in alternative energy sources, but in practice it 
seems to be making politicians more hesitant about carbon taxes, or other measures 
which might hurt firm profitability. 
  Since this congress is taking place in Europe, I may as well say something 
about the continent, although it is far from clear that authors from elsewhere would 
regard this as particularly necessary. Depending upon how long it lasts, the current 
economic crisis could turn out to be an existential moment for the Union. Internally, 
the crisis could lead to a dramatic deepening of European integration, as the problems 
caused by our fiscal, banking, and regulatory fragmentation become increasingly 
glaring. Or, it could lead to the opposite: to an insidious unravelling of the Single 
Market, as struggling governments try to look after their own. Externally, the crisis 
could either lead to a strengthening of the world’s multilateral institutions, or to 
increasing economic (and non-economic) nationalism. In the latter case, Europe 
would no longer have anything useful to say to the world, since multilateralism is 
what Europe stands for politically. 
  A second trend, which is probably more predictable than the first, is that the 
world will face growing resource scarcity over the course of the next century: of oil, 
of water, of various obscure but essential metals, and of a healthy environment. The 
last point is crucial, since it provides a counter to those who might hope for further 
major discoveries of carbon-based fuels: if such fuels do not in fact turn out to be 
scarce over the course of the next century, it will become the job of policy to make 
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world will become more Malthusian, not in the technical sense of fertility becoming a 
positive function of living standards, or of living standards being driven down to 
subsistence levels, but in the broader sense of the natural environment once more 
placing firm constraints in a greater range of areas on what human societies can and 
cannot do. Economists and economic historians have in recent years increasingly 
emphasised how the Industrial Revolution was above all a means by which the West 
broke free from Malthusian constraints, through constant technological progress 
(which one may hope will still continue), but also by substituting “inorganic” energy 
sources such as coal for “organic” energy, and by adding the vast land resources of 
the New World frontier to the cramped endowment of Europe (Wrigley 1988, 
Pomeranz 2000). As the frightening spike in world food prices last year showed, if 
ever we come to depend on our land endowment for fuel as well as food in the future, 
as was the case before the 19
th century, the consequences could be catastrophic. We 
will need solutions other than biofuels to the problem of shrinking fossil fuel supplies. 
   If countries and economic agents accept that rising fuel prices are a signal that 
we have to change our behaviour, and adapt accordingly, then there will be greater 
investment in alternative energy sources, in fuel-efficient public transportation, in 
research and development into more efficient modes of private transport, and so on. 
On the other hand, countries might try to insulate themselves from rising prices, and 
thus from the international market, for example by trying to carve out privileged 
sources of supply for themselves. This scenario, which is obviously extremely 
dangerous, is part of a broader set of risks which will be discussed in the next section. 
Rising oil prices will have unpleasant geopolitical consequences from a 
Western perspective, as we saw in 2008. When oil prices rise, some of the most 
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scruples in using its command of fuel supplies as a geopolitical weapon. If Europe 
develops alternative sources of supply, including the proposed Nabucco pipeline 
linking Europe to the Caspian Sea, and unifies its energy market so that the Russians 
can no longer divide and conquer the continent (on whose market, let us not forget, it 
is more dependent than the EU is on it), this would greatly help in stabilising the 
marchlands between the EU and Russia. On the other hand, if major European 
countries such as Germany and Italy continue to put their own interests above the 
interests of Europe as a whole, by privileging bilateral energy relationships with 
Russia, then Europe will deserve whatever is coming to it. Unfortunately, the ultimate 
victims may be in Ukraine or Georgia, rather than in the EU itself. 
The discussion thus far has been largely focussed on the East-West axis, but 
there is also the North-South axis to be considered. The good news seems to be that 
one potentially destabilising element in North-South relations, namely Southern 
population growth and resultant migration pressures, seems to be moderating of its 
own accord (Hatton and Williamson 2009). Unfortunately, the benign effects of the 
demographic transition which is underway look set to be swamped by the extremely 
alarming consequences of global warming, which may turn out to be the dominant 
security threat over the coming century. As several recent reports have pointed out, 
drought has already fuelled conflict in several regions of the world, including Sudan, 
and this trend seems set to continue. The possibility that rising sea-levels might lead 
to the collapse of states such as Bangladesh, with major consequences for 
neighbouring states, has also been widely flagged.  
Of particular interest in a longer-run historical context is the possibility that 
the melting polar ice-cap will open up a northern passage between the Atlantic 
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greatly reducing traffic along the Suez Canal and around the Cape. At one level it 
might seem that this would be good for international trade, while strengthening the 
competitive position of Korea, China and Japan. At another level, we are already 
seeing signs of potential conflicts over who should control these sea-lanes, and the 
Arctic mineral resources that may become accessible in time. The moves of 
Greenland towards independence from Denmark could inject another dangerous 
element of instability into this equation unless the island is firmly anchored into some 
durable security arrangement, since Greenland is clearly incapable of ensuring its own 
security. 
 
4. The big risk: a Malagasy future? 
  One of the most worrying news stories of last year was that involving Korea’s 
Daewoo Logistics leasing almost half of Madagascar’s arable land on a 99 year basis. 
According to initial reports, the land was to be leased for around $12 an acre, but an 
article in the Financial Times subsequently reported that in fact Daewoo was planning 
to lease the land at zero cost, with increased employment opportunities for the locals 
being the sole payoff which would accrue to the African island. 
  The alarming aspect of this story was not the fact that Daewoo’s behaviour 
was pretty obviously exploitative. Rather, it was the Korean motivation for the deal: 
“We want to plant corn there to ensure our food security. Food can be a weapon in 
this world,” said Hong Jong-wan, a manager at Daewoo. “We can either export the 
harvests to other countries or ship them back to Korea in case of a food crisis.”  
In turn, this rationale can be explained by the fact that “[Food-importing countries] 
have lost trust in trade because of the price crisis this year” (in the words of Joachim 
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Washington). 
  All of this should send shivers down the spine of anyone with a sense of 
history. Markets are a political institution. The deal they represent is straightforward: 
if you are willing to pay the going price, then you can buy what you need. When 
countries start to doubt whether that deal will remain valid going forward, and in 
consequence act to carve out sources of supply for their own exclusive use, the 
geopolitical consequences can be catastrophic. 
  According to a seventeenth century textbook, 
 
[Divine Providence] has not willed for everything that is needed for life to be found in 
the same spot. It has dispersed its gifts so that men would trade together and so that 




This optimistic view of international trade as a force for peace is appealing, but 
international trade also leads to mutual interdependence, and thus to vulnerability, as 
suggested by the Daewoo statements cited above. When nations start focussing on 
these vulnerabilities, rather than on the mutual benefits of trade, it is time to start 
worrying. 
  The uneven spread of industry during the 19th century interacted with the 
globalization of the time to produce an extreme specialisation involving industrial 
producers on the one hand, and primary commodity producers on the other. The 
vulnerabilities which this implied were one factor among several which ultimately led 
to war, and the collapse of that period’s globalization. According to Avner Offer, a 
key element in the sequence of decisions which led to World War I was the fact that 
                                                 
1 Cited in Hirschman (1977), pp. 59-60. 
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and raw materials. “The economies of both Britain and Germany came to depend on 
hundreds of merchant ships that entered their ports every month. Overseas resources, 
the security of the sea lanes and the economics of blockade affected the war plans of 
the great powers and influenced their decision to embark on war.”
2 
  British planners, initially concerned about their own vulnerabilities, started to 
focus on German vulnerabilities and the potential of blockades as a weapon against 
Germany. German commanders similarly came to the conclusion that their 
dependence on imports meant that a long-drawn out war was not in their interests, and 
that an overwhelming attack on France was thus to be preferred. And at the other end 
of Eurasia, concerns about the continuing availability of raw materials would play an 
important role in prompting Japanese aggression during the 1930s. 
  When the international division of labour breaks down, or when planners fear 
that it will break down in the future, the temptation to grab resources inevitably 
strengthens.
3 The last thing we should want is for such worries to become 
commonplace in the context of the multipolar world of the 21st century, whose rising 
powers are heavily dependent on strategic imports, just as their predecessors were in 
the past. In addition, there is the issue of how the inhabitants of countries like 
Madagascar will react to such land grabs. The news that one of the first actions of 
Andry Rajoelina, the leader of Madagascar’s coup, was to cancel the Korean land deal 
is hardly surprising, and suggests a further potential source of international tension in 
the decades to come. 
 
 
                                                 
2  Offer (1989), p. 1. 
3 When creditor nations find themselves confronted with the prospect of a reserve currency whose long 
term prospects are uncertain, to say the least, the temptation to buy such resources is further increased. 
  135. Domestic politics and globalization backlashes 
  The brief survey of long run trends above reveals a plethora of ways in which 
the world is becoming a more dangerous place. But even if our leaders get the 
geopolitics right, there is still the possibility that domestic political systems will lead 
to a major anti-globalization backlash in the years ahead. Indeed, this might have been 
the case, even if the current world economic crisis had not intervened. 
  Nineteenth century history provides a useful cautionary tale here. Prior to that 
date, intercontinental trade had largely involved goods characterised by a high ratio of 
value to weight, since these were the goods which could bear the very high costs of 
transport of the time. As such, they were largely (if not exclusively) non-competing: 
they did not displace domestic producers to any great extent, and the tariffs that may 
have been levied upon them were imposed more to raise revenue, thus increasing the 
plenty and power of the state, than to protect domestic interest groups. (Indian cotton 
textiles are an important exception that proves the rule.) 
  From the 1840s onwards however, the transport revolutions of the nineteenth 
century led to a historic and dramatic decline in international transport costs. For the 
first time in history, it now became economical to transport such bulky and low-value 
commodities as wheat between continents on a regular basis. Such ‘competing’ 
commodities could be produced worldwide, on continents with very different 
endowments of land, labour and capital. European landowners now found themselves 
in direct competition with farmers on the Great Plains, the Argentine pampas, Russia, 
Australia and the Punjab. Not surprisingly, European rents and land prices 
plummeted, in Britain (which remained open to free trade) by roughly 50 percent. 
O'Rourke and Williamson (1994, 1999) show that almost all of this decline can be 
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prices.  
  As we know, in most European countries there was a protectionist backlash, 
with countries such as France and Germany imposing high agricultural tariffs, which 
were typically extended to the industrial sector as well. What is striking is how 
quickly this backlash occurred. It was well underway by the late 1870s, only three or 
four decades after the decline in international transport costs had really gotten 
underway. The tariffs which were imposed were sufficiently high as seriously to 
impede the integration of international agricultural markets (Federico and Persson 
2007), and can be seen as the direct precursors of today's EU Common Agricultural 
Policy. 
  The lesson of the late 19
th century Atlantic economy is that globalization can 
come under severe political pressure when it links together continents with very 
different factor endowments. This lesson is not contradicted by the experience of the 
post-1945 period. As Findlay and O’Rourke (2007, Chapter 9) stress, until the 1980s 
and 1990s post-war globalization was a mainly regional phenomenon, linking 
together OECD economies which were very similar in terms of economic 
development, capital-labour ratios, and living standards. Trade between them was 
largely intra-industry in nature, rather than being driven by strong factor endowment 
differences between trading partners. It thus involved fewer distributional 
consequences than late nineteenth-century trade, which made it politically easier to 
sustain. It is telling that OECD economies were endowed with very different ratios of 
labour to land, and that agriculture was conspicuously absent from the waves of trade 
liberalisation achieved under the auspices of the GATT. This suggests that potential 
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earlier. 
  In recent decades the nature of globalization has radically changed, with the 
collapse of communism in much of the world, and both India and China opening up to 
international trade. The spread of industrialisation across the Third World has meant 
an increase in the South's share of manufactured exports, and a dramatic switch in the 
composition of North-South trade, with the South shifting from an almost exclusive 
reliance on exporting primary products to exporting larger volumes and a wider range 
of manufactured goods. As in the nineteenth century, globalization is once again 
linking together continents with very different factor proportions, the South having 
lower capital-labour ratios and less skilled workforces than the North. Rather than 
exporting complementary, and often non-competing, primary commodities, the South 
is now exporting potentially competing manufactured goods. The obvious question 
which arises is whether the present-day equivalent of late nineteenth-century 
European farmers, namely unskilled workers in the OECD economies, will eventually 
press for and obtain a rolling back of international economic integration. 
  It is certainly true that there has been a dramatic and well-documented 
distributional shift against unskilled workers and in favour of the more highly skilled 
in many OECD economies. The extent to which this shift is due to globalization, 
rather than to biased technological change, remains an extremely controversial topic. 
What is not in doubt, however, is that voters hold views about trade (and other 
dimensions of globalization as well, notably immigration) which are exactly what 
would be predicted if trade were hurting northern unskilled workers in classic 
Heckscher-Ohlin fashion. A considerable political science literature, building on the 
important contribution of Scheve and Slaughter (2001), has shown that individual 
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is, in rich (skill-abundant) countries, unskilled workers are much more protectionist 
than skilled workers, but this effect gets weaker in poorer countries, and disappears or 
even reverses in the poorest countries. Perceptions matter in politics: if unskilled 
workers in rich countries believe that they are being hurt by globalization, this could 
be sufficient to produce an anti-trade backlash, regardless of the accuracy of these 
beliefs. 
  The 2005 French referendum on the so-called European Constitution, when 
unskilled workers voted against what they saw as a pro-market, pro-globalization 
accord, should serve as a wake-up call for politicians in this regard. Precisely the 
same cleavage between middle-class and working-class voters appeared in the 2008 
Irish referendum on the Lisbon Treaty, with blue-collar workers yet again being 
overwhelmingly opposed to further European integration. The possibility of a populist 
backlash against globalization seems to be rising all the time now, as voters discover 
more and more facts about the operation of tax havens, the consequences of 
‘regulatory arbitrage’, and the risks of unrestricted international capital flows. The 
obvious danger is that the additional pressures created by the macroeconomic crisis 
will be exploited by interests which have been becoming increasingly hostile to 
‘globalization’ in any case. If the leaders of democratic societies wish to retain the 
benefits of open international markets, they will need to take greater notice of the 
interests of those who are being left behind. 
  However, the late nineteenth century offers another, more positive lesson for 
today's policymakers: by adopting appropriate domestic economic policies, they can 
defuse anti-globalization political pressures and maintain a consensus in favour of 
free trade. The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries saw the widespread 
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designed to protect ordinary workers, especially in those countries more open to 
international trade. For example, a range of labour market regulations was introduced 
across Europe, prohibiting night work for women and children, prohibiting child 
labour below certain ages, and introducing factory inspections. The period also saw 
the widespread introduction of old age, sickness and unemployment insurance 
schemes. In countries such as Belgium, governments incorporating both labour and 
business interests reached agreements whereby business would support the 
introduction of such a ‘labour compact’, in return for labour supporting the 
maintenance of free trade. Similarly, post-1945 economic growth in Europe and 
elsewhere was largely based on an implicit ‘grand bargain’ between labour, capital 
and government, involving the provision of modern welfare states to insulate workers 
from the risks of the market economy. 
  The lesson for today is that if workers feel that their interests are being 
furthered by governments implementing appropriate domestic economic policies, then 
they are not necessarily hostile to international trade. This is an important lesson from 
history, since western economies are now at a critical juncture as regards the political 
legitimacy of the market. In the past year we have seen public anger in Germany and 
elsewhere regarding tax evasion in Liechtenstein and other tax havens, outrage about 
executive pay and bonuses, and large tax bailouts to financial institutions as a result of 
a financial crisis that originated in United States but has since spread around the 
world, causing economic devastation. The fact that these bailouts will in many 
jurisdictions coincide with cutbacks in the public services on which poorer people 
disproportionately rely will also arouse justifiable anger. Some of this has nothing to 
do with globalization, while some is linked at least in part with the consequences of 
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concerns about competition from China and elsewhere, and rising unemployment 
which will increase protectionist sentiment, it seems clear that we could be headed for 
a political ‘perfect storm’, unless governments can provide voters with reassurances 
that the market economy in general, and the international market economy in 
particular, can be made to work for them. Intelligent supporters of the market will 
favour, rather than oppose, reflation, regulation and redistribution in the months and 
years ahead. 
 
6. The economic crisis of 2008 and the 21
st century 
  If ever proof is needed that ‘history matters’, the Great Depression provides 
that proof. A series of policy errors, induced by the gold standard mentality, turned a 
severe recession into a worldwide depression, with catastrophic consequences. The 
Depression led directly to the election of Hitler, which in turn precipitated the horrors 
of World War II and the Holocaust, and the emergence of the bipolar world which 
was discussed earlier. It also led to the widespread introduction of barriers to trade, to 
a wave of defaults, and to the shutting down of international capital markets for 
several decades. 
  In the 12 months since world industrial production peaked, in April 2008, 
world industrial output and trade fell as rapidly as they did in the first 12 months 
following the June 1929 peak (Eichengreen and O’Rourke 2009). On the other hand, 
the policy response this time around has been much more aggressively reflationary, 
and at the time of writing there are signs that this may be bearing fruit, in that the 
period of freefall is at an end, and there are even some signs of bottoming out. 
Whether this marks the beginning of a durable recovery is as yet uncertain, however. 
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back to financial institutions, causing a second wave of financial crises which would 
in turn cause further problems for the real economy. The American consumer is 
retrenching, and it is still unclear as to who will emerge to replace him once 
governments stop filling the hole in demand he has left behind.  There is a danger that 
governments will not intervene to clean up their banks decisively enough, leading to 
stagnation of the sort experienced in 1990s Japan; and a danger that financial 
regulation will also be long-fingered, implying even bigger risks in the future. 
  The threat to the international economy is obvious. As unemployment rises, 
the way in which we view exports is turned on its head. From being a necessary evil, 
required to pay for imports, they now become a valuable source of demand, while 
imports become a threat to local employment. Even worse, when governments 
consider reflating their economies through fiscal stimuli, they may worry that their 
own expenditures will merely serve to boost incomes elsewhere by sucking in 
imports. As the Irish Minister for Defence put it on January 4, 2008: 
 
‘We tried the fiscal stimulus approach in response to the oil shock in the late 
seventies. The increased spending power given to the Irish consumer largely leaked 
out on increased imports and left us in an even worse position. There is absolutely no 
evidence to suggest that the same thing would not happen again… From Ireland's 
point of view, the best sort of fiscal stimulus are those being put in place by our 
trading partners. Ultimately these will boost demand for our exports without costing 
us anything.’ 
 
The incentive for individual countries to pursue protectionist policies is obvious, and 
a lot of the available historical evidence suggests that interwar protectionists were not 
completely irrational. For example, Clemens and Williamson (2004) find that in 
countries particularly badly hit by the Crash, high tariffs were associated with faster 
rather than with slower growth, other things being equal. One can well imagine that 
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regression analysis, and reacted accordingly. 
  However, the historical record also gives policymakers at least three 
compelling reasons not to give in to this protectionist temptation. The first is that 
interwar protection was beggar-thy-neighbour, and that what might have been 
individually rational was collectively damaging, even in the short term. The second is 
that these beggar-thy-neighbour policies had disastrous political consequences, for 
example undermining the more liberal elements in Japanese politics, and 
strengthening militarism there. The third is that interwar tariffs and quotas created or 
strengthened powerful import-competing interests in many countries, which often 
succeeded in locking in protectionism well into the late twentieth century, when it was 
certainly a long time past its sell-by date, whatever its impact on individual economies 
when pursued in isolation in the 1930s.  
  The main lesson of the interwar period is that if these dire consequences are 
not to come about, then getting the macroeconomics right is crucially important 
(Eichengreen and Irwin 2009). Thus far the policy response has been about as good as 
could have been expected, and this is the main reason to be cautiously optimistic 
about the future direction of the international economy. 
 
7. Two scenarios 
  It seems clear that there are reasons both for optimism and for pessimism 
when looking ahead to the next quarter century. In a pessimistic scenario, the current 
economic crisis is allowed to drag on for far too long, perhaps exacerbated by 
premature tightening of fiscal and/or monetary policy in key economies. This will 
heighten protectionist pressures, pressures which as pointed out above are on the rise 
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the Fed and Bank of England, leading to an overvalued Euro exchange rate: history 
shows that overvalued exchange rates are a potent force for protectionism. 
Alternatively, with the United States running out of ‘fiscal room’, a worsening 
economic environment there could lead to further stimulus packages being explicitly 
linked to protectionist measures of one sort or another. Presumably the WTO would 
not immediately collapse, but in a pessimistic scenario it would gradually become less 
relevant to member states, and more ineffectual. 
  The danger would then be that eventually – not in the next five or ten years, 
but perhaps by 2030 – this weakening commitment to multilateralism would start to 
collide with some of the longer run trends identified above, notably resource scarcity 
and an increasingly multipolar world. In such a context, countries might start to 
seriously worry about the ability of the market to provide them with the food and raw 
materials necessary for their survival, and in the worst of all scenarios they might start 
to link such worries with broader concerns about strategic rivalries. The bottlenecks 
and chokeholds on international trade which played such an important role in 
economic history in the past would make a dramatic comeback. We can easily 
imagine the ways in which Russo-European relations could be soured in such 
circumstances, but Kaplan (2009) points out that there is tremendous potential for 
Sino-Indian conflict in the Indian Ocean. On the one hand, “Zhang Ming, a Chinese 
naval analyst, has warned that the 244 islands that form India's Andaman and Nicobar 
archipelago could be used like a "metal chain" to block the western entrance to the 
Strait of Malacca, on which China so desperately depends” (ibid.). On the other hand, 
the Chinese response to their dependence on Malacca, which is to build a series of 
ports in Bangladesh, Pakistan and Burma, is heightening India’s fears of being 
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1914 are unnerving. Other potential flashpoints obviously include the Suez Canal and 
the Arctic; while the Malagasay example highlights the potential for a 21
st century 
‘scramble for Africa’, with all the risks which that implies, if faith in multilateral trade 
is allowed to collapse. 
  There are also more benign scenarios which one could envisage. A successful 
international policy response to the crisis could prove to ordinary voters that 
multilateral action works, and that other countries represent opportunities rather than 
threats. A process could be set in motion, as the Chinese are suggesting it should, 
towards setting up a more symmetric international monetary system. Franco-German 
calls for a more effective international regulatory framework might bear fruit. 
Together with the refoundation of the world’s multilateral institutions, including 
setting up an inclusive and democratically legitimate version of the G-20, all of this 
might help strengthen world governance at a time when future geopolitical trends 
make this absolutely necessary. In turn, such political structures could help the world 
deal collectively with the energy and resource problems which will inevitably become 
more important as the century progresses. 
  Nothing is set in stone. The choices politicians make matter, for better or for 
worse. They will matter more than usual over the next five years, and will play an 
important role in determining which of these two scenarios is more likely to 
characterise the world in 2030. 
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